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RECENT DECISIONS
Attorney, 63 Sup. Ct. 493 (1943).
It is a well established principle of constitutional law that, in
conformity with the separation of the powers of the Government under
the Constitution, the judicial branch will not usurp the powers of the
legislature by expressing an opinion as to what the law either is, or
ought to be, unless, in addition to the court acquiring original or
appellate jurisdiction in the manner provided for by the Constitution,
the expression of such opinion is actually necessary to the adjudica-
tion of the bona fide litigation of a personal or propel:ty right, pro-
tected by the Constitution, and which right is possessed by one of the
parties to the proceeding.7 Statutes prohibiting the use of contra-
ceptives have been held 8 to be constitutionally within the police power
of state sovereignty to prevent imimorality, 9 and have been held not to
violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit-
ing the deprivation of personal or property rights. And neither do
they constitute class legislation, nor do they violate the right to enjoy-
ment, pursuit of happiness, or freedom of conscience guaranteed by
the Constitution.' ° It has been further intimated that where the ad-
vice of physicians was included in the prohibition of the statute such
statutes would be constitutional. 1 Federal statutes prohibit trans-
mission and receipt of contraceptives through the mail, in either
export, import, or interstate commerce. 12  This prohibition also ap-
plies to transmission by or through public carriers.' 3
H. P. W.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EXTRATERRITORIAL VALIDITY OF Di-
voRcEs-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT DocTRINE.--Petitioners Williams
and Hendrix, domiciled in the state of North Carolina with their
spouses for more than twenty-four years and twenty years respec-
tively, went to Nevada, and having satisfied the six-weeks' statutory
residence requirement period were granted decrees of divorce based
U. S. 354, 360, 27 Sup. Ct. 509, 511, 51 L. ed. 836, 840 (1907) ; Cronin v. Adams,
192 U. S. 108, 114, 24 Sup. Ct 219, 220, 48 L. ed. 365, 368 (1904); Davis &
Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207, 220, 23 Sup. Ct 498, 501;
47 L. ed. 778, 782 (1903).7 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 56 Sup. Ct. 466,
80 L. ed. 688 (1936). "The court will not pass upon the validity of a statute
upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.
Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial
of the right to challenge, to one who lacks a personal or property right"
8 (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 682.
9 People v. Sanger, 222 N. Y. 192, 194, 118 N. E. 637 (1918) ; People v.
Byrne, 99 Misc. 1, 163 N. Y. Supp. 682 (1917).
10 People v. Byrne, cited supra note 9.
". (1939) 6 U. OF CH. L. REv. 261.
12 18 U. S. C. § 334, c. 8 (1942).
13 18 U. S. C. § 396, c. 9 (1942).
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on constructive service. Petitioners married each other in Nevada
and returned to North Carolina where they were indicted and con-
victed of bigamous cohabitation. Held, reversed. The full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution makes it mandatory upon a state to
recognize a valid divorce decree granted in another state to a person
domiciled therein even though defendant was not personally served.
Haddock v. Haddock I is overruled. Williams and Hendrix v. North
Carolina, 63 Sup. Ct. 207 (1942), rev'g, 220 N. C. 445, 17 S. E. (2d)
769 (1941).
The Supreme Court's decision in the instant case condoning
"quickie" divorces has been the subject of much controversy and
criticism, 2 notwithstanding that the law propounded is not so revolu-
tionary as the dicta.8 The law declared in the present case is limited
to this: when plaintiff only is domiciled in state granting decree, and
constructive service effected on defendant, then full faith and credit
is to be accorded. This conclusion operates as a necessary result if
the form and substance of the service meets the requirements of due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment.4 But although the evi-
dence dearly negatives the conclusion that the petitioners were domi-
ciled in the granting state,5 that proposition was resolved by the Court
with alarming alacrity,6 and contrary to salutary precepts of constitu-
tional interpretation.7 Insofar as the prosecution proceeded on two
theories 8 and the jury rendered a general verdict thereon, the Court
1 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. ed. 867 (1906). This was a civil
action instituted in the state of New York, by an abandoned wife, for separa-
tion and alimony. Husband's defense was a divorce decree obtained by him in
the state of Connecticut. The validity of the husband's new domicile was not
denied, but the court asserted that the state of Connecticut could acquire nojurisdicion over other spouse by constructive service, in view of libellant's
wrongful departure from state of matrimonial domicile.
2 See Burns, writing on Two Nevada Divorce Decrees Get Full Faith and
Credit (Mar. 1943) A. B. A. J. 125; Editorial Comment from Lay Press (Feb.
1943) A. B. A. J. 78; N. Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1943, p. 19, col. 8; N. Y. Sun,
Dec. 21, 1943, p. 1, col. 6.
s See our principal case p. 215, col. 1, "Nor do we reach here the question
as to the power of North Carolina to refuse full faith and credit to Nevada
divorce decrees, because contrary to the findings of the Nevada court, North
Carolina finds that no bona fide domicile was acquired in Nevada."
4 See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 463, 85 L. ed. 278, 283, 61 Sup. Ct.
339 (1940).
5 See Jackson, J., dissenting in our principal case, p. 219.
6 See Bums, cited supra note 2, p. 78, "Collusiveness of proceedings so
obvious that one suspects that Supreme Court was prepared in any event to give
its assent to notorious practise of obtaining quickie divorces."
7 See Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297
U. S. 288, 58 Sup. Ct 466, 80 L. ed. 688 (1936) Rule No. 4: "The Court will
not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of." But see Bums, cited supra note 2, p. 78, suggests remanding
case to state court for special findings of facts.
8 See our principal case, p. 210.
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was compelled to invoke the doctrine of Stromberg v. California,9 that
if one of the grounds for conviction is invalid under the Federal Con-
stitution, the judgment cannot be sustained. The majority insist that
we treat the case before us precisely as if the petitioners had resided
in Nevada for a term of years and had acquired permanent abode
there, and presuming bona fide residence of petitioners, the Court was
then confronted with substantially the same issue as existed in Had-
dock v. Haddock.'0
To ascertain whether or not a state has jurisdiction Justice
Douglas urges us to dismiss the notion that an action for divorce is
either an in personam proceeding or an action in rem. Rather, we
are to consider the problem in the light of domicile 11 which creates a
subsisting relationship between a state and its citizens. Since it is
sufficient for the exercise of many state powers,' 2 it should be equally
true with regard to marriage and divorce. The exercise of the power
is not contingent on the causes of marital rift but dependent solely
upon the relationship of a state to its bona fide residents. If the
laxity of the laws of one state conflict with the severe limitations of a
sister state, wherein the valid decree of the former is subject to
enforceability in the latter, thus resulting in an appreciable diminution
of state sovereignty, such is a "part of the price of our federal
system." 13
Whatever may be said as to the merits of this case, New York's
disposition of the matter has been confined to a most strict construc-
9 283 U. S. 359, 368, 51 Sup. Ct. 532, 535, 75 L. ed. 1117 (1930).
1o Cited supra note 1. Case provoked considerable criticism. See Beale,
Constitutional Protection of Decrees for Divorce (1906) 19 Hav. L. Rav. 586,
591, wherein this observation is made: "... . res-status of parties--not corpo-
real, and if doctrine of jurisdiction in rem is to be confined to tangible things
there can be no jurisdiction in rem over a personal status."; McClintock, Fault
as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 564; Strathorn,
Rationale of the Haddock Case (1938) 32 Ia. L. Rav. 796, 809. But see
Beale, Haddock Revisited (1926) 39 HAnv. L. Ray. 417, wherein author
reverses previous position and accepts decision as a necessary compromise.
"1 Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398, 59 Sup. Ct 563, 83 L. ed. 817 (1938),
"Residence in fact coupled with the purpose to make the place of residence
one's home, are essential elements of domicile; a person may have several
residences but only one domicile." Accord, Dicay, CONFLICTS or LAWS (1896
ed.) 95; see Matter of Newcomb, 192 N. Y. 238 (1908); 1 RESTAT MENT
CONFLICTS OF LAW (1934) § 22, p. 43; 1 BEa., CONFLICTs o, LAw (1935)
§ 10.8, p. 116, "It is often required in status regulating divorce proceedings that
in order to obtain a divorce a libellant must reside in the state. It will be seen
later that domicile in the state is required b, law in order to give a courtjurisdiction for divorce.- Since the court lacks jurisdiction unless there is a
domicil within the state, the proper interpretation of the statute is that the
residence required by it is domicil."
12 Cf. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U. S. 69, 61 Sup. Ct 924, 85 L. ed. 1193
(1941); Milliken v. Meyer, cited supra note 4; Lawrence v. State Tax Com-
mission, 286 U. S. 276, 52 Sup. Ct. 556, 76 L. ed. 1102 (1932).
13 See majority opinion in our principal case, p. 214, col. 2.
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tion thereof.14 In the Matter of Brogan'r5 it was held that a defen-
dant in a Nevada divorce action was precluded from impeaching the
validity of the decree in order to assert a claim under New York's
Decedent Estate Law § 18 because of his subsequent remarriage.
The Court, however, reaffirmed that all the Williams case did was to
remove from the question of "full faith and credit" the subsidiary
question of fault. McCarty v. McCarty,16 following this, avers that
plaintiff can challenge validity of defendant's decree despite the fact
that the court found that he abandoned her without reasonable cause.
The judgment of a sister state must be given full faith and credit but
the findings, are not conclusive when domicile was fraudulent and
ineffectual to confer jurisdiction.
H. C. W.
CONTRACT FOR SALE OF GOODS-CONTRACT FRUSTRATED BY WAR
-TOTAL FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION-REcOVERY OF MONEY PRE-
VIOUSLY PAID.-Appellant company was incorporated in Poland and
had its head and seat at Wilno. The defendant was registered and
carried on business in the United Kingdom. By a c.i.f. contract in
writing dated July 12, 1939, defendant agreed to sell and plaintiff to
purchase certain machinery for £4,800, of which L1,000 was in fact
paid. Delivery was to be three or four months from settlement of
final details at Gdynia in Poland, and the place of erection of the
machinery, though unmentioned in the contract, was agreed to be in
Wilno. The contract contained a clause to the effect that, "in the
event of war, a reasonable extension of time shall be granted". On
September 1, 1939, war broke out between Poland and Germany and
on September 3, 1939, Great Britain declared war on Germany.
About September 23, 1939, Gdynia was occupied by the enemy. Re-
spondents did not deliver the machinery and appellants claim the
return of the £1,000 paid on account. Tucker, J., dismissed the
action, and the Court of Appeal affirmed his decision. In view of
the fact that all Poland was then occupied by the enemy, appellants ob-
tained from the Board of Trade a license to proceed with the appeal.
Held, that the clause, providing for a "reasonable extension of time"
in event of war, could not prevent frustration of the contract by the
24 Cf. Matter of Brogan, 265 App. Div. 463 (2d Dep't), aff'g, 178 Misc.
801 (1943) ; Oberlander v. Oberlander, 179 Misc. 459 (1943) ; Reese v. Reese,
Queens Co. Sup. Ct, N. Y. L. J., March 13, 1943, p. 999; McCarty v. McCarty,
Kings Co. Sup. Ct., N. Y. L. J., Feb. 28, 1943, p. 478; Baker v. Baker, N. Y.
Co. Sup. Ct., N. Y. L. J., Feb. 24, 1943, p. 740; Jiranek v. Jiranek, Westchester
Co. Sup. Ct, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 28, 1943, p. 385
15 Cited supra note 14, 265 App. Div. 463 (2d Dep't), aff'g, 178 Misc. 801
(1943).
'1 Cited supra note 14, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 28, 1943, p. 478.
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